Operational Audit A Limit For The Dysfunctions Of Corporate Governance

Abstract

The debate on excessive executive compensation, accumulated as chairman of the board and chief executive officer, the exercise of voting rights at general meetings or the responsibility of the board of directors have promoted aspects of corporate governance.
To do this, the conceptions gave to corporate governance by severa! authors, led us to include that the main objective of corporate governance is to protect the interests of minority shareholders, controlling and minimizing conflicts of interest. To limit these divergences of interests, there are mechanisms intended to control directly or indirect! y way of opportunistic behavior of managers, in this case "operational audit". In this perspective we place the subject of this communication to show the role of the operational audit in corporate governance. In this regard, we will choose the descriptive method to evince that the operational audit doesn't appears now as only an audit that verifies just the operations, but also an aid in management, strategy and operations to reduce conflicts arising between shareholders and managers. Through this work we will focus on the role of the operational audit that is stay a fuzzy concept for severa! people, although it's role is more important and multiple. Tt's primatily to ensure that internai control deviees of activity exist and are efficient to detecting any problems, it's occurs as weil to audit the system of the company. Finally, the operational audit may be evenly practiced in order to ensure that all operations are made in accordance with laws and regulations.